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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The security of the maritime domain has become a topical area of concern, with 
threats thereto manifesting in multiple ways, ranging from military activities at sea to 
marine litter discharges and noise pollution. As an issue of common interest of the 
international community, maritime security has ignited some commendable initiatives 
both internationally and regionally, aimed at setting up new legal and institutional 
frameworks of cooperation. However, current regimes have proved to be ill-suited to 
address the globalised maritime challenges of today. By and large, a sustained 
common vision on how to better serve the common interest is currently lacking, 
owing in part to an intricate North-South divide over both rights and obligations 
regarding ocean governance. It is thus still necessary to merge the priorities of the 
various stakeholders into a comprehensive maritime security architecture.  
 
This policy brief purports to illustrate this state of affairs through a brief analysis of 
major themes related to maritime security. The selection of issue areas is based on a 
Colloquium on the current challenges in maritime security organised by the Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies on March 2013,1 and is further expanded to 
include prominent topics related to the environmental dimension of maritime security. 
Rather than addressing issues of entitlement to ocean space and use, the present 
paper concentrates on the question of how to conceive a responsible use of the 
maritime domain. For its purposes, the analysis in this paper is of course more 
illustrative than comprehensive and is intended to highlight current challenges and 
issues that should be taken into account by policymakers in the regulation of 
emerging seas uses.  
                                                 
1
 The speakers at this colloquium, sponsored by the Centre for Ethics of KU Leuven, were, apart from a 
welcome address by Prof. Dr. Jan Wouters, Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies and Full Professor of International Law and International Organizations at 
KU Leuven: Mr. Gaetano Librando, Senior Deputy Director and Head Legal Affairs of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), who addressed the topic of Maritime Security Initiatives of the 
International Maritime Organization; Dr. Markus Houben, Action Officer Regional Maritime Capacity 
Building of the European External Action Service (EEAS), who presented General Policy Principles of 
EU Action in the Field of Maritime Security; Lt Cdr Martin Fink, Royal Netherlands Navy (NL), 
Netherlands Defense Academy, who spoke about Maritime Embargoes and Naval Interdiction; and 
Prof. Dr. Erik Franckx, Professor of International Law, Free University of Brussels, whose topic was The 
Influence of Various Maritime Claims on Maritime Security, in the South China Sea in Particular. The 
event was chaired by Prof. Dr. Cedric Ryngaert, Associate Professor of International Law at KU Leuven 
and Utrecht University. 
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2. THE CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY – A FEW INITIAL REMARKS 
 
The many challenges currently faced in the maritime domain have broadened our 
understanding of the concept of maritime security. While traditionally linked to 
military State interests, maritime security has come to involve economic, political, 
societal and ecological concerns, thereby encompassing a broader range of 
activities and events. Certainly, maritime threats do not only stem from intentional 
illicit conduct but also from unintended harm linked to natural navigation risks. 
Identifying what activities these are and which interests are at stake is essential in 
the design of sustained responses to any perceived maritime security threat.2  
 
Security of whom? As elusive as the term may be, the security of the maritime 
domain can ultimately be interpreted as that of the entirety of mankind: for one, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), apart from affecting the marine 
environment and resources, my raise food security concerns to all. On another 
account, piracy and terrorism significantly impact upon the security of oil tankers and 
support boats, trade and maritime economic activities in general. The sources of 
threats evolve over time and, arguably, the main reason why the concept of maritime 
security is not a static one relates to its economic dimension: informed by 
geopolitical dynamics, it entails ‘constantly scanning the horizon for changing 
maritime trade patterns and their significance.’3 The economic uses of the oceans in 
the past two decades have contributed to an era of overwhelming and accelerated 
change, whereby a wide range of interconnected effects over the marine 
environment have come to pose significant challenges in every sector of the marine 
economy. 
 
Who, then, is to ensure security? Exclusive assertions of regulatory power over the 
maritime domain have been put forward by States to ensure the protection of their 
own maritime security interests. The structure of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(hereinafter EEZ), for instance, provides the necessary margin for coastal States to 
do so. In the high seas, flag States have exclusive jurisdiction over their vessels. 
While nationally focused interests will always be maintained, a balance must 
necessarily be reached between these and the interests that are shared by the 
international community, for an overall accommodation of competing maritime uses 
to be achieved. The transnational character of maritime security threats calls for 
increased international cooperation. Hence, the pertinence of strengthening the role 
played by international actors in the protection of the maritime domain, ranging from 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the UN Security Council to the 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. 
 
Strengthened maritime security measures may be seen as encroachments on the 
fundamental principle of mare liberum. However, maintaining the paradigm of non-
interference risks losing its legitimacy if it proves to jeopardize the interests of the 
international community as a whole. In this sense, maritime security measures 
become necessary for the very freedom of the seas to be safeguarded.  
                                                 
2
 See N. Klein, ‘Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea’, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 2-11. 
3
 A. M. Guedes, ‘Geopolitical Shifts in the Wider Atlantic: Past, Present, and Future’, in The Fractured 
Ocean: Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic, German Marshall Fund, 2012, p. 
12. 
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3. VIOLENCE AT SEA 
 
In order to make it possible for any stakeholder to actually start implementing a 
policy conceived by domestic policymakers or decision-makers on an international 
level with regard to the responsible use of the maritime domain, it is clear that a 
conditio sine qua non would be that all criminal activities in the maritime environment 
should cease to exist. 
 
Maritime security is very much related to the use of ships. Even though the natural 
environment of all vessels, the sea, is not without danger for the shipping industry in 
general or for a specific crew in particular. Indeed, a ship and its cargo can be 
subjected to a violent attack by criminals on board of another ship, whom for their 
own private reasons want to steal the goods on board or hijack the crew to obtain a 
ransom. Traditionally, these acts are referred to as acts of maritime piracy. Piracy as 
such is the original universal jurisdiction crime, meaning that universal jurisdiction for 
piracy is one of the oldest and least controversial rules of international law.4 
Unfortunately, according to international law, not all crimes in the maritime domain 
can be referred to as piracy.  
 
The present chapter aims to clearly explain a number of relevant distinctions that can 
and are to be made by policymakers with regard to violent crimes involving ships, 
cargo and their crews perpetrated in the maritime domain. Additionally, a factual 
background is provided to the reader, as well as an introduction to the applicable 
rules of international law which define the various violent crimes in the maritime 
domain. This chapter will also address some of the main legal issues and relevant 
current debates. Special attention will be given to recent Belgian developments in 
domestic criminal legislation with regard to piracy. Finally, this chapter will briefly look 
into the important contributions of international organisations to the fight against 
maritime violent crimes. 
 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Maritime Piracy 
 
In the past years, a considerable number of incidents related to maritime piracy have 
been discussed in the news. Whereas about ten years ago, most of those incidents 
took place in the Strait of Malacca, more recently the problems seem to have been 
shifting to the African Continent. Especially in the waters surrounding Somalia, the 
threat of piracy or armed robbery to commercial shipping seems to be predominantly 
present.5 On 31 January 2012, according to the Piracy Reporting Centre of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB PRC),6 there were no less than 10 vessels and 
                                                 
4
 E. Kontorovich and S. Art, ‘An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy’, 
Northwestern University School of Law, 2010, p.6 
5
  For the most recent information, visit the website of the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), subdivision of 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), part of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
available in: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
6 
“The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) is the world’s only manned centre receiving and 
disseminating reports of piracy and armed robbery 24 hours a day, across the globe. As part of the ICC, 
it is an independent body set up to monitor attacks, free of political interference. IMB strongly urges 
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159 hostages held by Somali pirates. The international community has been active in 
this domain by committing a considerable fleet of warships to the fight against piracy 
since 2008.   
 
 Drugs Trafficking 
 
The problem of drugs trafficking in the Caribbean region, mostly by means of small 
craft navigating from the coasts of the southern countries via small islands with 
relatively large territorial waters towards the coasts of the United States of America, 
has raised serious concerns for decades. It has, however, been under close 
investigation by the US Coast Guard and the international community from 2002 
onwards. Since that year, several nations have deployed warships in the Caribbean 
Sea in the fight against illicit drugs trafficking. 
 
 Maritime Terrorism 
 
Apart from some isolated incidents, such as the USS Cole incident7 or the explosion 
of the oil tanker Limburg, the threat of maritime terrorism is not that visible to the 
general public. However, using a ship as a weapon to obtain results in a fight fought 
for political reasons is not hard to conceive of in current terrorist undertakings 
especially in consideration of the aggrandizement of damage of a massive explosion 
in a built-up area in the light of the events of 9/11. 
 
Additionally, when considering the fact that most of the shipping nowadays is 
containerised,8 it is not unrealistic to envisage the scenario posited in 2002 by 
Commander Stephen Flynn of the US Coast Guard9 of a massive exploding device 
hidden in a container equipped with GPS and shipped in a distant port, passing 
through several intermodal transshipment points in different countries, in order to 
finally explode in a highly populated city or to be detonated at a major rail hub, such 
as Chicago,10 thus resulting in a major disruption to transportation in continental 
Europe, the United Kingdom or the United States of America.  
 
Indeed, policymakers should take into account the fact that approximately two 
hundred million containers are moved between ports annually.11 Additionally, the 
number of eight thousand ships that make fifty-one thousand port calls each year in 
the United States alone illustrates without any doubt the vulnerability of Western 
States to attack by sea.12 Also, it should be noted that those ships deliver 
approximately seven and a half million containers yearly, 13 of which only two percent 
                                                                                                                                           
shipmasters and owners to report all actual, attempted, and suspicious piracy and armed robbery 
incidents to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. Transparent statistics from an independent, non-political 
organization is vital to raising awareness and encouraging authorities to allocate resources to tackle 
piracy and armed robbery firmly. The IMB PRC is funded purely on donations.” See: http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
7 
 J.S. Mellor, ‘Missing the Boat: The Legal and Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime 
Terrorism’, American University International Law Review, 18(2), 2002, p. 364. 
8
  J.S. Mellor, ibidem, p. 348. 
9
  Ibidem, p. 348. 
10
  Ibidem, p. 350. 
11
  Ibidem, p. 351. 
12
 Ibidem, p. 342. 
13
 Ibidem, p. 342. 
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are actually inspected. The issue of preventing acts of maritime terrorism is thus 
clearly important. 
 
 Eco-piracy 
 
Finally, there are fairly new cases of “eco-piracy”, where ships are used to attack 
other ships not for private reasons (as is the case of pirates) or for political reasons 
(as is the case of terrorists), but for “other” motives, in the so-called “general 
interest”. “Eco-piracy” does not amount to an act of “terrorism”: the latter is defined 
by the FBI as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in 
the furtherance of political or social objectives.”14 Indeed, environmental groups such 
as Greenpeace or organizations such as the Sea Shepherd, the latter well-known for 
its fight against Japanese whalers,15 which do not board ships as a pirate would do, 
but rather ram them, constitute a sort of vigilante movement, showing a profound 
conviction that the government and its agencies are not capable of enforcing the law 
in a particular area.16     
 
 
II. LEGAL ISSUES 
 
 Public International Law 
 
Piracy on the high seas is a serious crime that, in conformity with Article 105 of the 
International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),17 can be tried by any 
country since the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to it.18 However, 
policymakers should be fully aware that this principle is not to be misunderstood as 
universal prosecution. Indeed, being allowed to bring a case before a domestic 
criminal court is not the same as being allowed to hunt down and arrest suspected 
pirates in any part of the ocean. Moreover, not every act of violence is considered to 
be an act of piracy, and thus, not all acts of violence in the maritime domain can be 
tried according to the principle of universal jurisdiction. In fact, the offence of piracy is 
very strictly defined in international law. One of the limitations is to be found in Article 
101 of UNCLOS which stipulates that the crime has to be committed “for personal 
reasons”.  
 
The consequence is that acts perpetrated for political motives, such as maritime 
terrorism, are not comprised by the concept of piracy, which in turn implies that the 
principle of universal jurisdiction is not applicable to them. An additional important 
element to be taken into account is the fact that acts of violence committed on board 
                                                 
14
 G. Nagtzaam and P. Lentini, ‘Vigilantes on the High Seas? : The Sea Shepherds and Political 
Violence’ in Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(1), 2007, p. 113.  
15
 The most notorious pirate whaling ship was the Sierra, captained by a Norwegian and a Japanese 
crew that killed 1,676 whaling during a three-year period. The meat had been sold to the Japanese 
domestic market.  
16
 E. Sprinzak, ‘Right-Wing Terrorism in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization’ in 
Tore Bjørgo, ed., Terror From the Extreme Right, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p.29. 
17
 21 ILM (1982), 1261. 
18
 J. Wouters, Internationaal recht in kort bestek, Intersentia, 2006, p. 99. 
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of any ship by members of its own crew or by some or all of its passengers, such as 
hijacking, theft or murder, are also not considered to be acts of piracy. 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, as amended in 2005 (hereinafter 2005 SUA Convention)19, solves some 
of the issues, such as the “private ends” and the “one ship-two ship” debates,20 but 
jurisdiction over the offences mentioned in Article 3(1) of this Convention is not 
universal.21 Moreover, according to Article 10 of the Convention, States have a 
positive obligation to either extradite or prosecute alleged pirates, but they are not 
required to find and arrest those pirates.  
 
Finally, the 2005 SUA Convention is problematic in the sense that it is reactive in 
nature and not very specific in stating how a legal regime able to prevent maritime 
terrorism would look like.22 
 
 Domestic Criminal Law: the case of Belgium 
 
In 2009, the Belgian federal legislator has taken a very interesting initiative, by 
adopting on 30 December the “Law with regard to the fight against piracy at sea”, 
published on 14 January of the following year. It contains legally binding definitions 
of the concepts of “piracy”, “pirate ship”, “pirate group” and “Belgian ship”. 
Additionally, the crime of “piracy” is defined according to national law and criminal 
punishments are established. Finally, the procedure for arresting and prosecuting 
pirates according to Belgian national law is clearly defined.   
 
Interestingly, the law deals in an elegant way with the most common problems so far 
experienced in the fight against piracy. These are mainly related to bringing an 
alleged pirate before a judge in a timely manner or the authority of the Commanding 
Officer of a Belgian warship to arrest alleged pirates. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
authority to arrest alleged pirates is extended to the Commanding Officer of a 
Belgian military vessel protection detachment on board any merchant vessel. Also to 
be noted is the fact that violent attacks or attempts thereto committed by the crew of 
any private ship against any other ship for private ends, but not on the high seas, is 
still punishable and is to be regarded as “crimes of piracy”. Even mutiny on board of 
a warship, followed by acts of piracy committed by the crew that has taken control, 
can lead to prosecution for “crimes of piracy”. Finally, provisions are also made for 
the prosecution of any individual or organisation helping with the financing of or 
facilitation of piratical attacks, regardless of whether the activity has been deployed 
at sea or ashore. 
 
As illustrated by the following excerpt of the Belgian newspaper ‘La Libre Belgique’, 
the Brussels Court of Appeals convicted a Somali pirate who had hijacked the 
Belgian commercial vessel Pompeï23 and had later on been captured by a Belgian 
Navy Ship on November 29th of 2010, and subjected him to ten years imprisonment 
under this new legislation: "Le jeune Somalien qui avait été capturé le 29 novembre 
                                                 
19
 27 ILM 668 (1988), and Protocols thereto adopted on 14 October 2005. 
20
 J.S. Mellor, op.cit. supra, p. 383, 
21
 Ibidem, p. 383. 
22
 Ibidem, p. 384. 
23
 Released after a few months of negotiations and payment of a ransom of 1,94 million US $. 
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2010 par l’équipage du Louise-Marie, la frégate belge qui participait à la lutte contre 
la piraterie dans l’océan indien sous l’égide de l’opération européenne Atalanta, vient 
d’être condamné par la cour d’appel de Bruxelles.” 24 
 
 
III. OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
 
 Maritime Security Initiatives of the International Maritime Organization 
 
In the context of the Colloquium on the current challenges in maritime security,  
referred to in the introductory paragraph of this policy brief, Mr. Gaetano Librando, 
Senior Deputy Director and Head Legal Affairs of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) presented an overview of the various security initiatives 
undertaken by the IMO.25 More specifically, he mentioned IMO actions devised to 
implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), by which the Council 
had called on those States and international organisations able to do so, to actively 
participate in defeating piracy and armed robbery off Somalia’s coast, by deploying 
naval vessels and military aircrafts, and through seizure and disposition of boats and 
arms used in the commission of those crimes. The Council had even stated that 
States and regional organisations could undertake all necessary measures 
“appropriate in Somalia” (thus also on land), to interdict those using Somali territory 
to plan, facilitate or undertake such acts. This resolution had been adopted 
unanimously, following a letter of 9 December 2008 from the Transitional Federal 
Government urging for international assistance to counter the surge in piracy and 
armed robbery. 
 
Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created on 14 January 2009. This voluntary, ad 
hoc international forum brings together countries, organisations, and industry groups, 
all of which share the interest of combating piracy. Participating States seek to 
coordinate political, military, and other efforts to bring an end to piracy off the coast 
of Somalia, and to ensure that pirates are brought to justice. The Group meets three 
times a year at the UN, while its five Working Groups meet regularly around the 
world to develop and implement national counter-piracy policies and programs. 
Nearly 70 countries and several international organisations participate in the 
CGPCS, including the African Union, the Arab League, the EU, the IMO, NATO, and 
various departments and agencies of the UN.  
 
Mr. Librando mentioned the important fact that, according to the IMO data on 
maritime piracy, the number of actual piracy attacks and attempts for the first 
trimester of 2013 had reached the lowest level in 11 years.  Indeed, according to Mr. 
Librando, since its creation, the CGPCS contributed to a marked reduction in the 
volume of pirate attacks and hijackings. More specifically, over the last three years, 
the number of successfully pirated ships dropped from 47 in 2010, to 25 in 2011, 
                                                 
24
 La Libre Belgique, ‘Dix ans pour le pirate somalien’, 16 February 2012. 
English translation : “The young Somali who had been captured on November 29
th
 of 2010 by the crew 
of the Louise-Marie, the Belgian frigate that was taking part in the fight against piracy in the Indian 
Ocean under the supervision of the European Operation Atalanta, has been convicted by the Brussels 
Court of Appeals.” 
25
 See Mr. Librando‘s conference notes, included in this policy brief as Appendix 1. 
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down to 5 in 2012. The Contact Group quite logically welcomes this progress, but 
recognises that the underlying causes of piracy remain and that pirate action groups 
are still active. The lecturer mentioned that, for this reason, the IMO has recently 
sent letters to a number of States urging them to keep the same level of naval forces 
present in the region. 
 
 Maritime Embargoes and Naval Interdiction 
 
According to Mr. Martin Fink, Lieutenant-Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy 
(NL) and lecturer at the Netherlands Defense Academy, the world today faces the 
challenge of how to ensure the smooth, secure, unimpeded flow of maritime traffic 
through sea lanes and ports at a competitive cost, in light of UNCLOS.26 As noted by 
the lecturer, in a UN report of 2008 on ‘Oceans and the law of the sea’, the Secretary 
General referred to a number of threats that can minimize maritime security.27 
Interestingly, situations of armed conflict or peace security operations are not within 
the scope of maritime security.  
 
Mr. Fink explained that maritime interdiction operations (hereinafter MIO), performed 
by the navies of the world, are one of the tools used to strengthen maritime security 
at sea, but also noted the lack of a real definition of both maritime security and 
maritime interdiction. The first reference to MIO can be found in a statement of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait crisis, stipulating that they are 
naval operations that include the possibility of boarding a merchant vessel.  
 
With regard to the legal basis of MIO, the lecturer discussed the possibility of 
seeking consent, namely by asking another State whether it would be possible to 
come on board. According to Fink, this would of course be an option, but then it 
would still remain unclear whether such consent should be given by the master of 
the vessel or an official body of the flag State. From a practical perspective, it is 
logical that the master should be asked for permission, however, the master does 
not usually have the nationality of the ship. While consent based boarding can fill the 
gap when it comes to finding a legal basis to board a ship, it nevertheless falls short 
in creating a legal regime that defines what actions can be taken by a naval officer 
once the ship is boarded. 
 
 The Use of Naval Forces 
 
On an operational level and in order for national governments to be able to 
implement international regulations on the high seas, their only option is to appeal to 
the power projection capabilities of modern navies. Indeed, a well-established, well-
equipped and well-trained coast guard would be an option to guard ports and to 
monitor fishing and other activities within the territorial seas and the EEZ, but 
certainly not in the high seas. Moreover, when the necessary infrastructure or the 
means of the coastal States to effectively deploy a coast guard in a region affected 
with piracy or activities related to drugs trafficking or maritime terrorism are simply 
                                                 
26
 See Mr. Fink’s conference notes, included in this policy brief as Appendix 2. 
27
 ‘Oceans and the law of the sea’, Doc. A/63/63, 10 March 2008, para. 39. See also : 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/documents/9_magnusaddico.pdf, consulted on 27 
March 2013. 
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not present or are clearly insufficient, the only option for the international community 
is to turn to the military. 
 
In this context, and as noted by Fink, NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy illustrates the 
commitment to support maritime security through the use of naval forces. Indeed, as 
he states, NATO has identified new threats in relation to which it can play a role: 
these do not solely relate to the collective defense of the territory, but encompass as 
well aspects such as global trade, freedom of navigation and the flow of valuable 
resources. This means that NATO is evolving from an Article 5 organisation assuring 
collective defense of the allied territory to an organisation that performs non-Article 5 
operations, and ultimately, to an organisation that is fighting economic threats. 
 
 
IV. RELEVANT CURRENT DEBATES 
 
 Preventing maritime terrorism 
 
With regard to preventing maritime terrorism, the most obvious solution would be to 
intercept any threat offshore.28 Yet, since it is not feasible to impose an important 
delay on a large merchant vessel carrying up to 6.500 containers in order to inspect 
each and one of these, Commissioner Robert C. Bonner of the US Customs Service 
had indicated that the favored solution in the United States would be “to push the 
U.S. borders outward.”29 Of course, this concept raises the important issues of State 
sovereignty, though the United States seems to have already received permission to 
place customs officials in the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le Havre.30  
 
 Private or military vessel protection detachments 
 
There is also an intense debate regarding the legal consequences of private or 
military vessel protection detachments on board merchant vessels taking action 
against pirates, as illustrated by this recent article in the Belgian newspaper “La 
Dernière Heure”: “Le navire de croisière « Costa Delizioza » effectue un tour du 
monde de trois mois en passant par l’Océan indien. Cette zone étant infestée par 
des pirates, un plan de sécurité a été organisé à bord. L’Union européenne s’est 
engagée à combattre la piraterie en créant la mission Atalanta. La Belgique y 
participe et enverra pour la troisième fois une frégate au large de la Corne de 
L’Afrique. Notre pays propose également à tous les navires battant pavillon belge de 
bénéficier d’une protection d’une équipe VPD (Vessel Protection Detachment) 
composée de soldats d’élite. Seul un navire y avait fait appel. Le coût de cette 
protection serait de 115.000 euros/semaine. Jugée trop coûteuse par les navires 
civils, ceux-ci préfèrent faire appel à des sociétés de gardiennage nettement moins 
chères.”31 
                                                 
28
 J.S. Mellor, op.cit. supra, p. 354, 
29
 Ibidem, p. 355. 
30
 Ibidem, p. 356. 
31
 La Dernière Heure, ‘Contre la piraterie’, 27 March 2012. 
English translation : “The cruise ship « Costa Delizioza » is making a three month world tour sailing 
through the Indian Ocean. Since this zone is infected by pirates, a security plan was made up on board. 
Committed to fight piracy, the European Union has created the operation Atalanta. Belgium is taking 
part and will for the third time send a frigate to the Horn of Africa. Our country also offers the possibility 
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 Policing by naval forces 
 
From a legal point of view, and as explained by Fink, the fact that naval forces will 
continue to execute regular maritime security operations, will lead to major 
consequences that have to be resolved. Indeed, according to the lecturer, it implies 
the introduction of the legal paradigms of law enforcement for ships that would not 
normally have a policing task, and that, strictly speaking, would not simply be able to 
navigate the high seas and perform policing tasks.  
 
With regard to the EEZ, it may well no longer remain an economic zone, only to 
become a security zone. The question is thus raised whether this entails that naval 
operations in the future will not be allowed anymore within the EEZ.  
 
 Human Rights 
 
Traditionally, navies have focused on the implementation of embargoes, which 
merely relate to goods. However, since the introduction of maritime security 
operations, naval warships are required to deal with human beings. The importance 
of human rights in the maritime domain is, according to Fink, a real revolution and 
implies taking into account the human rights regime in maritime interdiction 
operations. 
 
 
V. A FEW REMARKS ON THE WAY FORWARD 
 
As a conclusion to the issues raised in this chapter, and as food for thought for any 
policymaker in the maritime domain, it is only prudent to state that it is important to 
be fully aware of the new developments and associated risks with regard to violent 
crimes such as piracy and maritime terrorism as well as of the various legal issues 
raised by these phenomena. 
 
Mr. Librando expressed the opinion that the decrease in number of attacks was the 
consequence of the presence of naval authorities fighting piracy operations, 
combined with the implementation of self-defense measures on ships, and more 
effective action both by the Somali authorities and the international community. The 
lecturer considers it to be vital to enhance coordinated efforts to eliminate the 
scourge of piracy, in order to consolidate this still fragile success. According to Mr. 
Librando, the ultimate solution for piracy lies onshore. He concluded by recalling the 
fact that in 1991 Somalia had become a failed State, and that there is now a new 
central government elected in Somalia, which brings hope for the future.  
 
Of course, a great deal of issues are still fairly new to the international community 
and thus policymakers must take action with urgency. Indeed, members of military 
forces, albeit proven very effective in the fight against pirates, are not trained police 
officers and alleged pirates are not warriors in the traditional sense. As clearly stated 
                                                                                                                                           
to all commercial vessels showing the Belgian flag to benefit from a protective team called VPD (Vessel 
Protection Detachment), composed by elite soldiers. Only one vessel has asked for this protection. The 
cost of this protection would be 115.000 euros/week. Judged to be too costly by the civil vessels, these 
prefer to ask for the help of private security companies that are significantly less expensive.” 
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by Fink, maritime interdiction operations aimed at avoiding that goods enter a certain 
maritime zone raise concerns that are quite different from those arising in a context 
where policing tasks involve human beings with human rights. In the future, it is very 
well conceivable that any operation in the maritime domain will be judged not by the 
traditional standard of victory at sea or on the battlefield on land, but by the actual 
number of convictions in Court. For these reasons, and although traditional legal 
principles such as State sovereignty - often put forward by countries in the southern 
part of the world - remain very important in these modern times to all members of the 
global community. The only way to deal with the above mentioned crimes on a global 
level is to fully cooperate on different levels, including the civilian and military 
authorities of all States, their law enforcement agencies and the global shipping 
industry. 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN THE MARITIME SECURITY DOMAIN 
 
Maritime security in the environmental domain is a matter of pressing concern in the 
international community. Not only the diversity inherent in geopolitical identities but 
also the heterogeneity of interests among coastal States, between them and port 
and flag States unavoidably create policy dilemmas and explain, for instance, the 
slow progress of the discussions in the framework of the IMO for the adoption of a 
binding Polar Code for shipping in the Arctic; why maritime spatial planning in the EU 
is intricate; or why adequate cooperative governance structures are lacking in the 
southern Atlantic to address the current challenges in that area. Undoubtedly, the 
interest based pressures of powerful private stakeholders add further complexity to 
policy and decision-making in maritime affairs.  
 
The present chapter addresses current normative and governance challenges in 
various issue areas of relevance to the environmental security of the maritime 
domain, namely, marine pollution, shipping, fisheries and climate change. 
Notwithstanding the clear interlinkages between these sectors, it is still possible to 
sketch out particular policy imperatives associated with each of them. The last 
section is intended to serve as a synthesis of the brief analysis undertaken, and to 
put forward a few overarching policy recommendations in the field of maritime 
environmental security. 
 
 
I. MARINE POLLUTION 
 
In a UN General Assembly Resolution from 2011, it was recognised that marine 
pollution constitutes a ‘serious threat to human health and safety, endangers fish 
stocks, marine biodiversity and marine and coastal habitats and has significant costs 
to local and national economies.’32 Marine litter, accidental discharge of noxious 
substances, onshore and offshore oil installations, shipping, land-based activities or 
dumping, all constitute pollution sources posing increasing threats to a healthy 
marine environment. Below, a brief analysis will be undertaken of prominent issues 
raised by some of these maritime security threats. 
 
                                                 
32
 UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/65/38, 30 March 2011, p. 4. 
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 Land-based pollution  
 
Land-based pollution (stemming, for example, from industrial effluent, sewage, urban 
or river run off) is by far the principal source of marine pollution, reflecting an 
imbalance between population growth and increasing industrialisation, on the one 
hand, and the limited capacity of the marine environment to take up the wastes 
produced thereof, on the other hand.  
 
The current framework established in UNCLOS is limited to providing general 
guiding principles and a global agreement dealing specifically with the topic is still 
lacking. This is mainly owed to the fact that, by implication, the activities responsible 
for land based pollution are located within the territorial sovereignty of each State, 
and thus, the establishment of a global detailed regime is hampered by the 
difficulties inherent in the geographical, economic and technological discrepancies in 
the world.33 
 
In the development of policies in this sector, it is important to keep in mind that land 
based pollution is closely connected to poor living conditions, particularly in coastal 
communities of developing countries where there is, for instance, a lack of basic 
sanitation. Hence, the emphasis placed by the UNEP/Global Programme of Action 
(GPA) on the importance of acknowledging the interlinkages between sustainable 
development of coastal and marine resources, poverty alleviation and the protection 
of the marine environment.34 The design of strategic programmes on the basis of a 
holistic integrated management approach has thus been advocated by the GPA, with 
the aim to ‘achieve the effective sustainable management of land-based activities, 
including the incorporation of the value of ecosystem services into planning 
processes.’35  
 
 Marine oil pollution 
 
Marine oil pollution mainly stems from petroleum consumption spills on land and, to 
a lower extent, from spills linked to regular shipping operations. Although offshore oil 
and gas exploration does not lie among the main contributing causes, the likelihood 
of a major accident, with possible extreme consequences, still poses considerable 
concerns to the security of the maritime domain. Offshore oil extraction is intensifying 
and, despite being greatly secured, there are no international safety standards apart 
from those defined by each company.36 For one, the BP oil rig blast in the Gulf of 
Mexico that occurred in 2010 reminded the world that it should remain watchful of 
the serious risks linked to this activity.   
 
The 2010 disaster ignited important initiatives at the regional level - the 2011 
European Commission proposal for a Regulation on safety of offshore oil and gas 
                                                 
33
 Y. Tanaka, ‘The International Law of the Sea’, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 268, 269. 
34
 See the UNEP/GPA website, available in: http://www.gpa.unep.org/index.php/about-gpa. 
35
 UNEP, ‘Manila Declaration on Furthering the Implementation of the Global Programme of Action for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities’, UNEP/GPA/IGR.3/CRP.1/Rev.1, 
2012, p. 2. 
36
 X. Gorce and A. Salvy, ‘Evolution of Illegal Activities at Sea and Governments’ Responses to Them’, 
in The Fractured Ocean: Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic,German Marshall 
Fund, 2012, p. 74. 
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prospection, exploration and production activities37 being a case in point. It was 
designed to cover the whole lifecycle of all exploration and production activities, 
covering varied aspects such as risk mitigation, emergency preparedness and 
effective responsiveness to accidents, and the establishment of adequate liability 
provisions.  
 
Given that many oil and gas companies operate at a global scale, it is clear that 
international solutions in this field are required as well. Regrettably, discussions in 
international fora such as the IMO, the G20 or OSPAR have so far suggested a 
rather slow progress in this regard. 
 
 Vessel-source pollution  
 
A prominent position in worldwide shipped tonnage is occupied by sea borne 
transport of oil products. The predicted rise in maritime transport, in fleet capacity 
and in the number of oil tankers points to concomitant heightened risks associated 
with such shipping operations. As noted by Scheiber, poorly maintained oil tankers 
flying flags of convenience raise considerable concern in this regard, but even ships 
following high standards of construction and operation can become the cause of 
major accidents, as the Exxon Valdez spill demonstrated.38 
 
Apart from oil spills, pollution related to shipping activities is generated by various 
other sources, ranging from discharge of sewage from passenger ships to accidental 
discharges of noxious substances. All these are generally regulated in important 
international instruments such as the London Convention and MARPOL, and 
corresponding annexes. However, in the presence of the serious dangers posed by 
shipping generated pollution, the current regulatory regime still reveals shortcomings 
related to an insufficient number of ratifications and a low efficacy in enforcement 
and compliance.39 
 
UNCLOS marked a paradigm shift in the regulation of marine pollution, from the 
principle of freedom to pollute to an obligation to prevent pollution. The primary 
responsibility for the regulation of vessel-source pollution lies with the flag State 
(Article 211 UNCLOS). However, and as will be seen in more detail below with 
regard to IUU fishing, combating unregulated dumping at sea or pollution from ships 
is, to a large extent, hampered by the practice of re-flagging. The spread of flags of 
convenience vessels debilitates the effectiveness of international regulation in a 
twofold manner: the standards (of construction, operation and safety, pollution 
control, and labour conditions) applied by flag of convenience States are low, 
thereby heightening the risk of accidents; when accidents occur, it is hardly possible 
to determine ownership and liability.40 In this context, port State control (prescribed in 
Article 218 UNCLOS and various international treaties in the field, including SOLAS 
                                                 
37
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and 
gas prospection, exploration and production activities, COM/2011/0688 final, 2011/0309 (COD), 27 
October 2011. 
38
 H. N. Scheiber, ‘Economic Uses of the Oceans and the Impacts on Marine Environments: Past 
Trends and Challenges Ahead’, in The World Ocean in Globalisation: Climate Change, Sustainable 
Fisheries, Biodiversity, Shipping, Regional Issues, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 91. 
39
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and MARPOL) has considerable potential in safeguarding compliance with the 
relevant normative framework.41 In order to strengthen the efficiency of port State 
control, coordinated action among port States is desirable, for the risks of “port 
shopping” to be avoided. 
 
The capacity to detect, identify and counter illegal discharges from ships is of utmost 
importance. While, for instance, enhanced surveillance systems in the North Atlantic 
(combined with effective means of action against offenders) have progressively 
contributed to reducing the negative environmental impacts associated with shipping 
operations, the situation is quite disparate in the South Atlantic. This is mainly owed 
to the limited size and training of coastguard units, as well as to the lack of a tangible 
legal framework to address such activities.42 Hence, the need to foster more 
concerted action between North and South, particularly aimed at promoting capacity 
building with regard to the latter. 
 
In general, inasmuch as marine pollution easily spreads beyond maritime 
delimitation boundaries, international and regional cooperation is critical in quelling 
this maritime threat. In order for maritime security in this field to be enhanced, it is 
important to devise an appropriate distribution of competences (among States) to 
minimize environmental harm.   
 
In what regards the design of new policies, special anti-pollution measures such as 
the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs)43 appear as important 
management tools in need of further development.44 This sort of spatially based 
management encompasses activities of multiple sectors, and thus, has the potential 
to enhance the protection of the marine environment, not only in the EEZ but also in 
high seas zones. For these systems to be set in place, attention at policy level 
should be drawn to developing scientific and technical guidance on the identification 
of ecologically or biologically significant marine areas requiring protection, especially 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Finally, the successful outcome of MPAs relies 
on effective management, attentive to the socio-economic needs of stakeholders and 
the idiosyncrasies of the various sectors involved. 
 
 
II. SHIPPING 
 
More than 90 percent of global commercial exchanges are carried out by 
international shipping. Albeit one of the safest and cleanest means of transport, 
shipping brings with it various threats to the environment. In the previous section, 
reference was made to oil spills, accidental discharges and marine litter, but other 
threats include greenhouse gas emissions, noise pollution and the transfer of alien 
potentially invasive species. 
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 In a UN General Assembly report, ‘Oceans and the law of the sea’, Doc. A/66/70, 22 March 2011, it 
was noted that there has been a significant increase in coverage of protected areas over the past 
decade but that many ecological regions, particularly in marine ecosystems, remained underprotected 
and presented variable tracks of management effectiveness (see p. 45). 
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Effective means to address the environmental impacts of shipping are all the more 
required given the expected increase in maritime transport associated with the 
intensification of trade flows in such diversified areas as the Arctic and the South 
Atlantic: new navigable areas will be opened up to regular shipping in the Arctic 
Ocean due to loss of ice, providing shorter alternative routes between East Asia and 
Eastern North America and Europe; in the Atlantic Basin, new dynamics will be 
provided by the opening of an enlarged Panama Canal in 2014, and the 
operationalisation of the Açu port, an immense industrial and port complex in Brazil. 
 
As the prime international organisation for regulating international marine shipping, 
the IMO has put in place a global regulatory framework that covers almost every 
facet of the shipping industry, including the prevention and control of pollution from 
ships. The international character of maritime transport calls, indeed, for such an 
international scope. Concerns have nevertheless been raised as to the slow pace of 
ratification of IMO environment related conventions, which not only jeopardises the 
protection of the environment due to a delayed implementation, but may also lead to 
unilateral, and thus uncoordinated, State action in the field.45 
 
Apart from the global normative regime set up in UNCLOS and IMO Conventions, it 
is noteworthy that complementary regulatory initiatives can be taken by States to 
enhance environmental protection. Port State jurisdiction over foreign ships (which is 
barely referred to in UNCLOS) assumes particular relevance in this regard. Through 
coordinated action, port States have indeed the potential to promote higher 
environmental standards, thereby contributing to the common interest in maritime 
security.46 
 
Specific regulatory measures may also be required to account for the concerns 
emerging in concrete regions. The Arctic is one of those cases where particular 
governance issues in the maritime security domain have been raised. As mentioned 
above, a substantial increase in (trans)Arctic shipping is predicted, posing significant 
threats to a region that has already manifested significant signs of fragility. In a study 
from 2009 entitled ‘Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment’,47 oil spills and accidental 
discharges of other toxic chemicals were identified as, possibly, the main sources of 
concern with regard to the growth of marine activity in the region. 
 
Article 234 of UNCLOS, regarding the polar regions, is particularly significant in 
allowing for coastal State regulation of vessel-source pollution in ice-covered waters 
in the EEZ. Despite the potentially major role to be played by coastal States, coastal 
                                                 
45
 J. C. Sainlos, ‘The International Maritime Organization and the Protection of the Marine Environment’, 
in The World Ocean in Globalisation: Climate Change, Sustainable Fisheries, Biodiversity, Shipping, 
Regional Issues, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp. 324 and 325. 
46
 In this context, the EU plays an important role in the regulation of shipping, and has in fact already 
adopted extensive legislation prescribing port-State requirements. See H. Ringbom, ‘Regulatory Layers 
in Shipping’, in The World Ocean in Globalisation: Climate Change, Sustainable Fisheries, Biodiversity, 
Shipping, Regional Issues, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, particularly pp. 355-361. 
47
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regulations alone will not suffice in adequately addressing the challenges presented 
by Arctic shipping.48  
 
Given that, at the moment, only few mandatory international standards apply 
specifically to this region, it is necessary that the international community as well as 
the Arctic States fill this gap. Hence, the adoption of a comprehensive legal 
framework focusing on the Arctic region is required. The IMO is particularly in a 
position to do so and has been in fact discussing the adoption of a binding polar 
code for navigation in ice-covered waters, which will be based on an existing set of 
IMO Guidelines. The code is meant to devise appropriate standards of maritime 
safety, pollution prevention, and damage control. Despite widespread agreement on 
the significance of adopting the polar code, discussions have been dilatory due to 
the diverging interests at stake. More effort should thus be expended into reaching 
an agreement, keeping in mind that any solutions require the collaborative efforts of 
the Arctic States, and ensuring the participation of the indigenous peoples of the 
Arctic as well as stakeholders involved in maritime activities in the area. 
 
The disclosure of scientific data on the various environmental impacts associated 
with shipping in the Arctic, as in any other part of the globe, emerges as an important 
pressuring tool for policy and decision-makers to adopt measures and programmes 
aimed at preventing or at least minimizing those risks. 
 
Among the various environmental concerns associated with shipping, the emission 
of greenhouse gases from ships has probably become the main threat to the marine 
(and atmospheric) environment in need of further international attention. Recognizing 
this, the IMO commissioned a study on the topic, which was concluded in 2009,49 as 
a basis to commence discussions on the adoption of a coherent and comprehensive 
regulatory framework.  
 
As remarked in the study, an important question to resolve within the IMO was 
whether a greenhouse gas regime for international shipping should be designed in 
light of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”, espoused by the 
Kyoto Protocol, or rather the IMO’s basic principle of “no more favourable 
treatment.”50 An answer to this question would determine whether emissions 
reduction related to shipping would be voluntary for developing countries or would 
rather apply to all ships, regardless of their flag (i.e. that of a developed or a 
developing country). The IMO embraced the second position and has adopted 
specific technical and operational reduction measures in July 2011, which are now 
contained in – the already in force -Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention. This 
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means that port States will be able to apply emissions standards in a uniform 
manner to all ships arriving at their ports.  
 
It is important to note that, throughout the discussions, concerns were raised as to 
the need to invest in capacity building and promote the transfer of technology and 
information to States, in particular developing States. This steered the adoption of a 
Resolution by the IMO in May 2013. Compliance with these measures is essential for 
the envisaged greenhouse gas regime for international shipping to be effectively 
implemented, and will only be possible if States and industries alike acknowledge 
that combined efforts are necessary to halt climate change. 
 
 
III. FISHERIES 
 
The idea that marine fisheries require effective conservation in order to remain 
sustainable is fairly recent in international fisheries politics.51 Currently, there is an 
elaborate legal and policy framework addressing the extraction of fish, and yet 
statistics on fish stocks announce worrying numbers of marine capture. A report 
published by FAO in 2012 pointed to a worsening scenario, with 57.4 percent of fish 
stocks being fully exploited, and about 29.9 percent being overexploited in 2009.52 
Fisheries management can be said to raise some of the bigger challenges in global 
marine governance.  
 
The security (i.e. sustainability) of fisheries is negatively impacted upon for various 
reasons, ranging from IUU, climate change and poor fishery practices to other 
factors directly concerned with ineffective management policies, such as harmful 
fisheries subsidies and overcapacity. In a joint publication of the World Bank and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), it was noted that ‘[a]chieving sustainable 
fisheries presents challenges not only of biology and ecology, but also of managing 
political and economic processes and replacing pernicious incentives with those that 
foster improved governance and responsible stewardship.’53 
 
A well-sustained security regime requires, first of all, effective mechanisms to ensure 
State compliance with, and enforcement of, existing rules of international law. Whilst 
flag States have the primary responsibility to exercise control over their fishing 
vessels, the reality is that this hardly materialises in relation to flag of convenience 
States, which often lack the capacity and even the willingness to regulate such 
vessels. Moreover, fishing vessels carrying these flags (which are usually engaged 
in IUU fishing in areas beyond the jurisdiction of the flag State, and are sometimes 
part of organised criminal groups) can easily evade flag State regulatory 
undertakings by simply re-flagging to another State. While improved flag State 
control is necessary, the role of third States in ensuring effective conservation 
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regimes should also be further explored through, for instance, inspection54 at sea 
and in ports of Contracting and non-Contracting Party vessels.55  
 
Deference to flag State jurisdiction has been connoted as problematic, in that it has 
hampered law enforcement efforts towards the strengthening of maritime security.56 
The importance of the role of port State authorities has thus been increasingly 
recognised, a significant development in this regard being the 2009 FAO binding 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (approved by the EU in 2011). 
 
With respect to high seas governance, Article 118 UNCLOS requires States to 
cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources 
in the high seas. To that end, and where appropriate, the setting-up of sub-regional 
or regional organisations is envisaged. In this light, Regional Fishery Bodies (RFBs) 
have been widely established. RFBs constitute the primary mechanism through 
which States currently collaborate in the governance of transboundary fisheries. 
Particularly important are those bodies with competence to adopt binding 
conservation and management measures, namely the Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations, which should be introduced wherever they are lacking.57 
In what regards IUU, most RFBs promote and implement measures to combat IUU 
fishing, ranging from awareness building and dissemination of information to 
aggressive port, air and surface surveillance programmes.58 Regrettably, RFBs have 
not been successful in achieving their goal of eradicating IUU, which is illustrated by 
the high incidence of IUU fishing and sophistication, and in the use of flags of 
convenience. 
 
More fundamentally, apart from the problem of free-riding by non-participants,59 there 
are systemic inefficiencies in fisheries management due to shortcomings in 
transnational cooperation: significant gaps in the coordination between these 
organisations have been identified, mainly owing to a lack of political will by some of 
the organisations’ members.60 As has been rightly pointed out, the conservation of 
marine living resources is a matter where the protection of community interests is 
visibly at odds with the promotion of national interests.61 Opting-out clauses enabling 
States to avoid compliance with adopted measures provide further leeway for the 
protection of national interests. Hence, stricter rules should be envisaged as to the 
use of these procedures.   
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Calls have thus been made for more concerted efforts by the international 
community and improved management of fisheries so as to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of shared fishery resources. Importantly, while maximum catches have 
been achieved in the North, due to intensive fishing in the coasts of developed 
countries, fisheries have been expanding to the South, increasingly targeting further 
offshore areas and deeper-water species. This trend provides an opportunity in high-
seas governance to avoid in the South the mistakes previously made in the North.62 
On the basis of the current threats to the security of fisheries briefly described above, 
a set of – non-exhaustive – observations and recommendations can be put forward: 
 
 IUU fishing remains a serious global challenge, and many efforts have been 
taken internationally and nationally to combat it. Apart from the need for stricter 
regulatory regimes, enforcement mechanisms and sanctions, as mentioned 
above, the development of new policies focused on capacity development, for 
instance through the training of staff and the harnessing of new technology, is 
highly necessary, particularly in developing port and coastal States.  
 
 Combating IUU fishing efficiently warrants more sophisticated mechanisms for 
detection and surveillance, particularly in the high-seas. Sharing information is 
critical not only for preventive measures to be taken but also for law 
enforcement action. 
 
 As rightly noted by FAO, solutions to the problem of overfishing pose 
longstanding regulatory challenges, requiring fishers to have clear ethical and 
financial reasons not to overexploit in their efforts to fish. Research on the 
environmental impacts of fishing and allowable catches would lead to more 
informed decisions on the side of management entities and fishers alike.63 
 
 The use of eco-labelling schemes for fisheries products in the global trade, 
constitute an interesting policy avenue to explore in combating 
overexploitation.64 Whilst concrete information is provided to consumers as to 
the - sustainably managed - origin of the product, or the criteria adhered to by 
the scheme’s originators, eco-labelling promotes sustainable resource use 
through consumer choices.65 
 
 In the UNGA Resolution 65/38, States were urged to ‘commit themselves to 
urgently reducing the capacity of the world’s fishing fleets to levels 
commensurate with the sustainability of fish stocks.’66 The issue of over-
capacity creates policy dilemmas in that it raises social and economic issues 
that often compete with sustainability considerations. It is however commonly 
accepted that improved discipline in respect of capacity enhancing fisheries 
subsidies (be it direct or indirect) is urgently required.67  
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 In general, the ‘greening of fisheries’ in the design and implementation of 
marine conservation policies calls for the application of guiding principles such 
as the precautionary principle, sustainable development, and the ecosystem 
approach.68  
 
 The creation of MPAs,69 for instance, constitutes an important tool for fisheries 
management devised in light of the ecosystem approach, and should be 
developed further. The EU has made commendable efforts in establishing 
conservational regimes, particularly by integrating the objectives of its Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive70 within its Common Fisheries Policy reform.71 
As a result, fisheries ecosystem plans have been developed for major 
European Marine Regions. 
 
 
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MARINE RENEWABLE ENERGY 
 
Human induced climate change can be said to be a ‘new’ maritime security threat. 
While not treated as such in a 2008 Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘Oceans 
and the law of the sea’, there was indeed mention to the fact that climate change 
‘may have important implications for maritime security’, thereby requiring a ‘new 
vision of collective security’.72 
 
Climate change is expected to emerge as a major driver of change in the maritime 
domain, whilst contributing to varied factors such as the rising of sea levels, extreme 
weather events, ocean acidification, and changes in the distribution patterns of 
marine species due to an increase of water temperatures. These factors not only 
impact upon ocean governance, but also raise new regulatory challenges. Taking the 
example of sea-level rise, it will most probably affect coastal communities, thereby 
requiring governance shifts towards the adoption of more holistic approaches (such 
as the implementation of the ecosystem approach, including MPAs); but it may also 
have significant legal impacts upon the delineation of the baselines of coastal states, 
as well as the outer boundaries of their EEZ claimed on the basis of such baselines.  
 
Given the novel challenges at stake, it might therefore be necessary to adopt new 
approaches to the current legal framework, and shift the interpretation and 
application of ocean law. Undoubtedly, this is an all-encompassing area where 
solutions are to be found not only in the law of the sea but also other - deeply 
interconnected – areas of international law, inter alia, international human rights law, 
environmental law and trade law.73 
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At the operational level, climate change warrants particular responses that take into 
account emerging ecological and social imperatives. As a means to mitigate climate 
change, many countries in the world have started to invest in programmes for energy 
production from renewable energy sources. Comprising more than 70 per cent of the 
Earth’s surface, the oceans have attracted increased attention in this regard, for their 
immense potential as a source for renewable energy.  
 
With regard to offshore wind energy, Europe has by far registered the highest 
growth, with the UK being the biggest market in the world for offshore wind 
turbines.74 The vast potential of this source of renewable energy is widely 
recognised, but a few technical, logistical and financial challenges must still be 
overcome.75 Offshore wind energy raises particular management issues in that it 
entails an effective coordination of multiple uses (and the impacts thereof) of natural 
resources, as well as of conflicting norms from different sectors and jurisdictions. 
According to the European Wind Energy Association, maritime spatial planning is a 
fundamental tool to enhancing offshore wind development: it reduces conflicts 
among uses, and thus, provides stability and clarity for investors; it contributes to 
bringing down the costs of wind energy; and allows for cross-border coordination.76 
Moreover, it promotes the preservation of critical ecosystem services, in order to 
meet economic, environmental, security and social aims.77 
 
The potential of ocean energy, (which stems from waves, tidal range, tidal currents, 
ocean currents, ocean thermal energy conversion and salinity gradients) is immense: 
according to some estimations, the world’s oceans contain more than 5 thousand 
times the current global energy demand.78 In general, ocean power technologies are 
still at an early stage of development with some technical advances registered, for 
instance, with regard to the conversion of tidal energy into electricity. Assessing the 
future role of ocean energy in mitigating climate change remains, however, highly 
uncertain, as a reduction of costs associated with technology development is 
necessary for the broad-scale deployment of ocean energy.79 The question does not 
lie so much on technical potential but rather on the conditions of local communities 
which, in the future, will have to select the available ocean technology that better 
suits their local resource characteristics.80 
 
Despite the increased concern for greener economies, and the upward trend in 
renewable energy investment, the reality is that the use of clean energy to meet 
specific local requirements in developing countries is still lagging behind. As noted 
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by the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change, 
several billion people ‘experience severe energy poverty in terms of inadequate and 
unreliable access to energy services and reliance on traditional biomass.’81 Their 
pressing need for new power capacity therefore calls for expanded access to 
modern energy services, in a way that is ‘economically viable, sustainable, 
affordable and efficient, and that releases the least amount of GHGs’.82   
 
Much more effort has to be placed by the international community on capacity 
additions in renewable energy, including marine renewable energy, to achieve the 
desired outcome of global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. To this end, 
enabling policies, clear regulatory frameworks and financial incentives both at local 
and international levels are required. Next to this, Governments play an important 
role in promoting the sector, by creating a sense of stability and predictability for 
research and investment.83 Considering the particular needs of developing countries, 
it is important to ensure that access to (marine) renewable energy is prioritised in the 
development assistance of these countries and that action is taken to strengthen 
partnerships and enhance capacity building through the mobilisation of financial 
resources and technical know-how. 
 
 
V. WAY FORWARD 
 
The brief analysis undertaken in this policy brief illustrates how present and 
emerging challenges in the maritime environmental security domain may require a 
shift in the current law of the sea and in ocean governance in general.  
 
An immediate point to emphasise is the interconnectedness of the topics addressed, 
with intertwining cause and effect relations that should be duly taken into account in 
maritime security policy and decision-making. A new paradigm informed by more 
effective, efficient and holistic solutions is thus called for. To this end, an integrated 
cross-sectoral response to maritime environmental security is key. This is the 
approach that has been enthusiastically pursued by the EU, in particular the 
European Commission: in its quest for “blue growth”, it has devised an Integrated 
Maritime Policy - comprising Maritime Spatial Planning and Integrated Coastal 
Management, Integrated Maritime Surveillance and Marine Knowledge – aimed at 
setting up a more coherent approach to maritime affairs, with strengthened 
coordination among different policy areas, including fisheries, energy, transport and 
the environment.84 
 
While the challenges described in this chapter are global in scope, it is undeniable 
that for effective solutions to be achieved, cooperative initiatives undertaken at the 
regional level, such as the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy, remain essential, in that 
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they take into account particular local environmental, social and economic 
conditions. 
 
On the basis of the challenges sketched out above, a few overall recommendations 
can be put forward for consideration in relation to future policies regarding 
environmental maritime security: 
 
 Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that the oceans are essential for 
sustainable development. It is thus a challenge for the international community 
to maintain the value of the seas as foundations for a sustained “blue growth”, 
so as not to compromise their ability to provide vital resources and critically 
important services. 
 
 The precautionary principle plays an important role in future approaches to 
marine environmental protection. The use of the “best available knowledge” in 
decision-making, including both scientific and traditional knowledge, should be 
encouraged. It promotes risk assessment and management, and furthers the 
notion that even in cases where detailed scientific knowledge is lacking, 
decision-making should take place.85  
 
 An integrated natural resource management requires holistic solutions, which 
include the adoption of an ecosystem approach. In this context, the 
introduction of marine spatial planning and MPAs is encouraged, particularly in 
areas beyond the States’ national jurisdiction, in order to mitigate the 
cumulative impacts of sectoral activities taking place in those areas. While 
MPAs are usually associated with sustainable fisheries management, they are 
surely of relevance as well in the fight against marine pollution and climate 
change, as seen above.   
 
 Improved monitoring to identify threats to the marine environment at the 
regional, national and local levels is necessary. The success of surveillance 
and control of illegal activities at sea would surely benefit from enhanced 
information sharing networks, involving a much needed coordination of efforts 
between flag States, port States and coastal States.  
 
 Transparent and open decision-making processes are required. Moreover, it is 
important to involve stakeholders, organisations and strategic partners in the 
design and implementation of policies so as to ensure an effective 
multilateralism. 
 
 Finally, building human and institutional capacity is critical to ensuring full and 
effective implementation of existing regulatory regimes. It is of utmost 
importance to strengthen, in particular, the capacity of developing countries in 
the development of national and regional programmes aimed at managing 
maritime security threats, and to provide them with tools, know-how and 
technology to implement such strategies. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The present policy brief has unveiled a complicated legal and policy environment 
when it comes to addressing issues of ocean governance. This state of affairs 
should not, however, detract policy and decision-makers from cooperating towards 
the delineation of new effective and politically acceptable responses to maritime 
security concerns.  
 
With respect to the current legal framework in the maritime domain, it has been 
noted that considerable weight is attached to sovereign interests. A more 
constructive approach to maritime security would be to regard the threats thereof as 
threats affecting the collective interests of States. For instance, notwithstanding the 
importance of coastal States’ enforcement jurisdiction over their territorial sea with 
regard to IUU fishing or marine pollution, it is also true that these States are 
sometimes unable to tackle such issues, or simply do not prioritise them. These 
types of limitations lend themselves to multilateral collaborative efforts, a good 
example being the 2008 CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security Co-operation 
Agreement. In light of Articles VII and VIII of the Agreement, the fifteen CARICOM 
member States are entitled to patrol and undertake law enforcement operations 
within the territorial waters of a State party in order to address activities which 
threaten the security of the Region or that of the State Parties.86 Regulatory regimes 
devised with regard to ocean space and use should therefore strive to 
accommodate, to the extent possible, national interests with the broader interests of 
the international community.   
 
With particular regard to law enforcement powers, it should be recalled that 
deference to flag State authority on the high seas, as a corollary of the principle of 
freedom of the seas, has hampered efforts aimed at improving maritime security. As 
already noted, the problems linked to the phenomenon of flags of convenience 
cannot be overstated. Regulatory efforts towards the strengthening of the overall 
effectiveness of port State as well as coastal State control have taken place (for 
example, through the recognition of the right of visit), but only to a limited extent. 
Legal developments aimed at reallocating competences by particularly strengthening 
the role played by States other than the flag States should thus be more thoroughly 
considered in the future, as a cooperative endeavour that accounts for the common 
interest in furthering the security of the maritime domain. 
 
Apart from the need to establish a robust regulatory regime and cooperation tools to 
combat the various maritime security threats already referred to, it should be noted 
that, currently, the operational dimension of maritime security is perhaps in more 
pressing need of development.  
 
In this regard, one should reiterate at the outset the interconnectedness between the 
various issue areas of concern to today’s maritime security. Taking the case of the 
Gulf of Guinea as an example, violence prone flows are on the rise in the area, with 
illegal activities such as piracy,87 armed attacks at sea or drug trafficking meriting 
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increased attention by international organizations such as the UN or the EU; at the 
same time - and not coincidently, as the main target of the attacks is the oil sector88 - 
the Gulf of Guinea’s hydrocarbon reserves are the second-biggest in the world. This 
makes it the biggest source of energy supply to the US, which, by 2015, might rise to 
25 per cent.89 If we consider that, in the years to come, the operationalisation of 
renewable energy on and from the sea will most certainly affect current trading 
patterns, also in the area of the Gulf of Guinea, consequences will most certainly be 
felt with regard to the share of oil tankers crossing the seas and associated risks of 
oil spills. 
 
The example of the Gulf of Guinea shows that the various threats to the maritime 
domain interact synergistically. This entails that policymaking in a specific area of 
maritime security should take into account the broader spectrum of security threats, 
challenges and developments manifested elsewhere. As noted by the UN Secretary-
General,‘[s]ince those threats are interconnected, the failure to address one threat 
may exacerbate the risk of another’.90 It is thus important to keep in mind that a 
shared and holistic system of ocean governance is required at international, regional 
and national levels. 
 
Maritime surveillance and information sharing constitute an outstanding example of 
how one policy can entail such a diversified range of cross-sector ramifications, from 
the detection of piracy and IUU fishing, to the surveillance of oil spills and illegal 
discharges by vessels. While the North Atlantic is equipped with more sophisticated 
means to detect and track illegal activities, such as the CleanSeaNet service of the 
European Maritime Safety Agency, these do not exist in African coastal States. 
Using maritime surveillance as a common tool could do much in improving the 
security of the maritime domain: for instance, Northern countries concerned with the 
surveillance of piracy in the South Atlantic could cooperate with African States in 
curbing marine pollution (as well as other illegal activities) by providing to these 
countries satellite imagery of the main maritime routes off their coasts.91  
 
Illegal activities are particularly prominent in the South, where security arrangements 
are ‘to a great extent reactive and executed without much planning’.92 Efforts should 
thus be expended on the operationalisation of a well-sustained collective security 
architecture in the region. To this end, it is first of all essential to stimulate dialogue in 
the South, given the absence of a common agreement on the various challenges 
faced and the means to tackle them. Moreover, the setting up of more robust 
governance structures would surely benefit from increased cooperative endeavours 
of more developed countries.  
 
From the above, it can be concluded that it has become critical to adopt shared legal 
and institutional frameworks addressing the implications of activities undermining the 
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security of the sea. Moreover, and as already noted, the efficacy of these regimes is 
inextricably dependent upon the capacity of States to exercise the authority to 
enforce them. Capacity building efforts should thus be devised keeping such 
premises in mind.   
 
Ocean governance, be it at the international, regional or national level, can only be 
truly meaningful if it is shared, and, for this to be achieved, it is first and foremost 
essential to foster a global consciousness about the current challenges threatening 
the security of the maritime domain. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
International Maritime Organization and Piracy 
Gaetano Librando, Senior Deputy Director, Legal Affairs Office, International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) 
 
 
I am very pleased to participate in this maritime colloquium, and I am grateful for the 
invitation from the Catholic University of Leuven. 
 
IMO is the United Nations specialised agency with responsibility for the safety and 
security of shipping, the prevention of marine pollution by ships and the legal matters 
relating thereto.  
 
Today I intend to present a brief overview of the IMO activity to address the problem 
of piracy.   
 
Allow me to recall that Piracy has been a criminal activity for so long, that it is one of 
the few and earliest activities to be regarded as an international crime. 
With regard to the fight to piracy, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) reflects what was already customary international law, that is: every 
State has not only a right but also a duty to take action to curb piratical activities. 
Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “all States shall co-operate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of piracy.” 
 
The traditional definition of piracy is to be found in Article 101 of UNCLOS, which 
states that piracy consists of any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation 
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship [or aircraft], 
and directed, on the high seas, against another ship [or aircraft] or persons or 
property on board; or against a ship, [aircraft,] persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State.  Important elements of the offence are, therefore, the 
motive -a private end, not a political purpose; and place- on the high seas, and areas 
beyond the jurisdiction of any State. 
 
Shipping carries more than 90% of the world trade on which all of us depend for our 
daily lives and is an integral component of today’s global society. Shipping has a 
direct bearing on people all over the world, taking food, fuel, raw materials and 
manufactured items from wherever they are produced to wherever they are needed.  
It is, therefore, in everybody’s interest to ensure that ships and the seafarers 
operating them are properly and effectively protected. 
 
IMO has been addressing piracy since 1988.  A key component of IMO’s strategy 
has been to foster the development of regional agreements. This has worked to 
considerable effect, most notably in the former piracy hot-spot of the Straits of 
Malacca, Singapore and the South China Sea, where the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP), concluded in 2004, became the first regional Government-to-
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Government agreement to promote and enhance co-operation against piracy and 
armed robbery. 
 
At the turn of the last century, piracy was thought to have been eliminated, but as we 
know, in recent years there has been resurgence, particularly off the coast of 
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and then beyond the Horn of Africa and in the 
western Indian Ocean. 
 
IMO and, more recently, the United Nations have worked together to address the 
issue, taking several initiatives to coordinate appropriate action among interested 
parties, including Governments, international organisations, as well as political and 
defence organisations, and the industry.   
 
In a further effort to tackle piracy from all possible angles, in January 2009, an IMO 
sub-regional meeting on maritime security, piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea States, held in Djibouti, 
adopted what has become known as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which took 
immediate effect. 
 
The Djibouti Code aims at ensuring co-operation among its (20) signatories on the 
following matters: 
 investigation, arrest and prosecution of pirates;  
 interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and property on board such ships; 
 rescue of ships, persons and property subject to piracy and armed robbery; 
and 
 conduct of shared operations – both between signatory States and also with 
navies from outside the region.   
The Code also provides for the sharing of piracy information, through information-
sharing centres in Sana’a (Yemen), Mombassa (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam 
(Tanzania). 
 
The signatories to the Code also undertook to review their national legislation with a 
view to ensuring that they have laws in place to criminalise piracy and armed robbery 
against ships and to make adequate provision for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
conduct of investigations and prosecution of alleged offenders. 
 
For the purposes of promoting full and effective implementation of the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct, IMO has established a Project Implementation Unit (PUI). This Unit also 
coordinates and manages the execution of relevant capacity building activities.   
 
Such activities are carried out in cooperation with other entities concerned, including 
the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN-DOALOS), the 
European Commission, the Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP-ISC), the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International Criminal Police 
Organization (Interpol).  
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To date, the Project Implementation Unit has organized about 30 training courses, 
including train-the-trainer programmes on maritime law enforcement operations. 
About 500 persons from the region have attended these courses 
. 
The establishment of a Regional Training Centre in Djibouti, in partnership with the 
EU, was another significant step towards the creation of regional capability to 
counteract pirate activities.   We expect the construction of the new building for the 
Centre to be completed during the current year.  
 
Among a range of activities  envisaged ahead, IMO  will, for example, assist Somalia 
to ratify and implement the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) and incorporate its provisions into Somali legislation.  
 
One important benefit of this is that SOLAS mandates compliance with the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which could provide a platform for 
the development of port security programmes and procedures to enable ports in 
Somalia to comply with international standards, thus promoting trade by sea and 
providing additional security to World Food Programme and other humanitarian 
shipments.  
 
In addition, secure port areas could serve as a basis for the expansion of security 
controlled zones in coastal areas, policed by land based security forces, which could 
eventually link together to enable effective coastal monitoring. They could also serve 
as secure operating bases for maritime police, coast guards and fishing vessels, in 
due course.  
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the carriage of firearms on board merchant ships is a 
complex legal issue and countries hold diverse positions on the subject. Following an 
intense debate at IMO, a set of interim guidelines for privately contracted maritime 
security personnel (PCASP) was agreed which should help all those involved to 
reach the most appropriate conclusions. 
 
As stated in the relevant IMO circulars, this interim guidance and recommendations 
“are not intended to endorse or institutionalise” the use of armed guards. It is for 
each flag State to decide whether or not privately contracted maritime security 
personnel should be authorised for use on board ships flying its flag.  If a flag State 
decides to permit this practice, it is up to that State to determine the conditions under 
which the authorisation will be granted.  
 
It should be noted that the use of privately contracted maritime security personnel 
should not be considered as an alternative to Best Management Practices (BMP) 
and other protective measures developed by the industry. 
 
Before passing the floor to the other distinguished guest speakers, I would like to 
stress that IMO is heavily involved also in the creation of an effective legal 
framework to deal with pirates, and that the IMO Legal Committee, for the last few 
sessions, has considered a variety of issues related to the problem of piracy.  
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A notable initiative of the IMO Secretariat was to undertake a review of existing 
national legislations to prevent, combat and punish the crimes of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.  This was done in cooperation with UN Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea (UN-DOALOS) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes 
(UNODC). 
 
An analysis by the Legal Office of IMO of the legislations submitted by States 
showed that there was no harmonization and that there was an uneven incorporation 
into national law of the definition of piracy and other relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 
Relatively few countries fully incorporated the definition of piracy contained in Article 
101 of UNCLOS, as well as a jurisdictional framework based upon the concept of 
universal jurisdiction regulated by that Convention. In most cases, piracy was not 
addressed as a separate offence, with its own jurisdictional framework, but was 
merged within more general categories of crimes, such as robbery, kidnapping, and 
violence against persons.  In these cases, prosecution and punishment can only take 
place in accordance with a jurisdictional scope that is more restricted than the scope 
of universal jurisdiction regulated in UNCLOS.  All these factors, alone or in 
combination, make legislation less effective in achieving successful prosecutions. 
 
These, and other findings, were referred to the IMO Legal Committee for further 
consideration. 
 
The Committee agreed that there was a need for all States to have in place a 
comprehensive legal regime to prosecute pirates, consistent with international law, 
based on UNCLOS, customary international law and elements of the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), 
which complement the UNCLOS provisions.   
 
The view was also expressed that the development of a new international instrument 
might be premature, or unnecessary, in light of the existing international legal 
framework on piracy, which was generally considered to be adequate and that, for 
the present, guidelines or model legislation might be more useful, along with capacity 
building in States to assist with enactment or revision of domestic laws. 
 
To facilitate this process, the documents prepared by the Secretariat, UN-DOALOS 
and UNODC, for the consideration of the Committee, have been circulated to the 
IMO Members.  These documents identify the key elements contained in the SUA 
Convention, the UNCLOS Convention, the Organized Crime Convention and the 
Hostage Convention that may be included in national law, in order to facilitate a full 
and uniform implementation of the provisions of these Conventions. 
 
In addition to the above, IMO actively supports the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coasts of Somalia, which was established pursuant to UN Security Council 
resolution 1851. This Contact Group is a mechanism of cooperation whose aim is to 
facilitate the discussion and coordination among States and organisations to 
suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. Within the Contact Group there are five 
main Working Groups that deal with:   
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1. Military coordination, information sharing and the establishment of a regional 
coordination centre; 
2. Legal issues, and particularly the judicial aspects of piracy; 
3. Reinforcing the awareness of the threat represented by piracy; 
4. Enhancing the public information on every aspect of piracy; and 
5. Coordination of international efforts to identify and disrupt the illegal financial 
flows. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, recent figures suggest that all this work is beginning to pay 
off. The number of attacks and successful hijacking this year are at the lowest level 
in comparison with the last three years.   
 
This decrease may be attributed to a combination of factors, including: the presence 
of naval forces disrupting pirate operations; implementation of self-protection 
measures on board merchant ships and better situational awareness of where the 
threats are; coupled with more effective action ashore in Somalia by the Somali 
authorities and the international community.   
 
IMO gives a cautious welcome to this downward trend in successful attacks. In fact, 
this year, the IMO Secretary General has refocused the Organization’s efforts by 
setting the bold targets of eradicating maritime piracy and ensuring the release of all 
hostages as soon as possible.  To this end he has sent letters to the States and the 
organisations most involved in the region, urging them to maintain the current level 
of naval forces in the Gulf of Aden.   
 
Of course, it is not at sea that the ultimate solution to the problem of Piracy off the 
coast of Somalia is to be found, but on shore. Its root cause is centred on the 
political instability that has torn Somalia apart since 1991, making it a failed State for 
more than twenty years. With the first permanent central government in the country, 
which was inaugurated in the autumn of last year, there is hope that this situation 
can change and that the international community will be able to tackle this complex 
issue in a more effective way and to defeat piracy once and for all. 
 
Thus there needs to be a concerted effort to stabilise Somalia, and to bring to some 
meaningful justice those who have used the crime of piracy for their personal gains, 
and this is where the international effort is concentrating. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Some Remarks on Maritime Interdiction Operations and 
Maritime Security 
Martin Fink, Royal Netherlands Navy, Netherlands Defense Academy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In many aspects maritime security and maritime interdiction operations are closely 
related. One particular aspect is that maritime interdiction operations are one of the 
practical tools by which maritime security is implemented at sea. It is not the only tool 
by which maritime security is implemented in the maritime domain, but maritime 
interdiction operations are the only tool that involves the deployment of military, or 
more specifically, naval forces.   
 
The undefined scope of maritime security 
 
Because as lawyers we always like to have a definition of what is meant by terms we 
are using, it is first of all interesting to note that both the terms maritime security and 
maritime interdiction operations are not specifically defined and do not have 
internationally accepted or crystallized definitions. What is meant by maritime 
security can differ from State to State and may differ from international organization 
to international organization. This is even more so for what is meant by maritime 
interdiction operations. Maritime security is often defined not by what is meant by 
maritime security itself, but by listing the different threats that can be potentially 
harmful to maritime security. As an example, the UN-Report on Oceans and 
International Law of the Sea (2008) can be mentioned.93 In his report the UN-
Secretary General did exactly this, and first stated that there is no universally 
accepted definition of maritime security, and went on to mention examples of how 
maritime security may be threatened. Among other issues he mentioned: piracy and 
armed robbery, actions against the integrity of the state, terrorist acts, illegal fishing, 
pollution and damage to the marine environment94. Enhancing maritime security is 
thus done by minimizing the threats against it.  
 
Maritime security and the role of naval forces 
 
Whatever the exact scope of maritime security may be, it is clear that since 9/11 
there has been a growing belief that naval forces can play a significant role in 
enhancing maritime security. When one views the list of threats against maritime 
security this appears only partly logical at first instance, as the subject are not all 
issues that traditionally fall within the scope of operations attributed to the military. 
Notwithstanding this, actual military operations, such as the anti-piracy operations by 
the EU (Operation Atalanta) and NATO (Operation Ocean Shield) and the evolved 
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NATO’s anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour, are conducted to enhance 
maritime security. But even more important however is that the view that naval forces 
can play a significant role is now also formally embedded in military strategy 
documents. This is for instance the case in the most recent NATO Alliance Maritime 
strategy (AMS) that was issued by NATO in 2011.95  
 
NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) 
 
NATO’s new maritime strategy explicitly mentions maritime security as one of the 
four roles that naval forces can perform within the Alliance context. With the AMS, 
NATO nations have committed themselves to contribute to enhancing maritime 
security through the military, and in particular by means of naval forces. Like the 
earlier mentioned UN-Report, the AMS also does not mention what exactly maritime 
security means, but instead sketches the maritime security environment and lists the 
threats perceived by NATO to be threatening maritime security. Notably, apart from 
the more traditional threats considered by NATO, such as terrorists, weapons of 
mass destruction, threats against peace and security and the territorial integrity of 
the member states, NATO now also considers to have a role in more economic 
threats, such as threats for instance against global trade, valuable resources, 
freedom of navigation and critical infrastructure. As such, NATO as a military 
collective defence organization has grown over the years from defending territorial 
integrity under Article 5, to peace support operations in the 1990’s, to enhancing also 
the economic security of its member states. Territorial integrity to NATO now 
appears to mean more than just the physical territory of the Alliance, but also its 
security interests that can be threatened beyond the physical boundaries of its 
member states.96   
   
Legal consequences for maritime interdiction operations 
 
In very broad lines and from a legal point of view, committing naval forces to 
maritime security brings about at least three interesting points that can be noted: a 
further focus on the law enforcement paradigm within maritime operations, the 
applicability of international human rights law and the need for an interagency 
approach.  
  
The law enforcement paradigm 
 
Firstly, maritime security in relation to naval forces introduces another legal paradigm 
to contemporary naval operations and specifically in maritime interdiction operations. 
Whereas naval forces where mainly operating within the realm of armed conflict and 
peace and security, it now also has to deal with the paradigm of law enforcement. In 
other words, maritime security is pushing naval forces more and more into a role in 
which they are actually policing the high seas. This is a fundamental shift in focus 
because the basic point of departure in international law of the sea is that a general 
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maritime policing task for states and their warships on the high seas does not exist in 
international law. This was underlined by the International Law Committee (ILC) in 
1955. Yet, what we see is that politics and maritime strategy seem to be moving from 
the mare liberum concept to the mare clausum concept, in which governing the 
global commons by policing the seas is viewed essential for the security of states. 
Thus, some discrepancy appears to exist as to which direction politics and strategy 
have taken with regard to governing the global commons, and what the current 
status of international law can provide to support this evolution. The issue of where 
international law of the seas stands on this debate at present day is under debate.97  
International human rights law 
 
The second point to note is that after the fall of the Berlin Wall maritime operations 
were very much focussing on enforcing economic sanctions imposed by the UNSC. 
These can be called maritime embargo operations. These operations primary 
mandate are to stop and seize sanctioned goods, based on the measures taken by 
the UNSC within the collective security system. Whereas embargo operations focus 
on goods, the effect of the law enforcement paradigm is however that these naval 
forces now also have to focus on human beings. Piracy may be the most obvious 
example. The obvious legal consequence of this shift is that under certain 
circumstances human beings introduce international human rights law (IHRL) to be 
applied in maritime interdiction operations. That IHRL cannot be ignored in maritime 
interdiction operations is also underlined in national court cases on piracy98 and in 
internationally, before the European Court of human rights (ECHR). The most 
famous cases are the Medvedyev99 and the Hirsi case100. Furthermore, in the latter 
case we see also that traditional maritime law on rendering assistance is being 
caught up by and getting intertwined with norms of IHRL. Where this new marriage 
may end is yet to be discovered.  
 
The applicability of IHRL to maritime interdiction operations brings in the first place 
practical challenges for naval forces at sea. Examples that can be mentioned are the 
right to legal counsel during the first interrogation and the obligation to bring a person 
promptly before a judge. Furthermore, it is often experienced that military did not 
have well enough training on evidence gathering so that it can be useful or 
admissible in courts.  
 
Interagency approach 
 
As a third point to note, which flows from the above mentioned points, is that the 
success of maritime operations is not anymore solely dependent on what naval 
forces do at sea, but has in fact many more stakeholders. Successful operations 
more frequently depend also on what happens in the aftermath of the actions at sea. 
The overall success of the mission is ultimately fought over in court rooms instead of 
only at sea. Practically, this has significant organizational effects.  
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In order to align these to processes at sea and in the aftermath an interagency 
approach in which more governmental organizations will have to be involved at 
certain stages in interdiction operations at a greater detail is essential. Without these 
other agencies, such as justice or foreign affairs, we may only achieve part of the 
mission. Naval forces can stop and thwart the act, but obviously cannot punish or 
extradite for further adjudication the possible suspected criminals themselves. For 
this interaction to work successfully on the one hand naval personnel has to learn 
the legal language of law enforcement and integrate this in operating procedures. On 
the other hand other agencies need to understand the essentials of military 
operations the manage expectations is to what naval forces can do for them at sea. 
One example may be the fact that it is necessary for military operations to treat 
certain information as secret, whereas the same information may also be needed in 
a court of law to try the suspects.  
 
Interagency also fulfils another important factor: That of the issue of having the 
proper legal authority to be able to act against a certain threat. Naval personnel 
usually do not have law enforcement powers. These powers to act against threats of 
maritime security must then come from somewhere else, for instance the public 
prosecutor. Again, piracy is a good example of this. The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) may give warships the authority to act101, but also 
national legislation will have to that ensure that naval personnel is given the proper 
authorities so that it can act as police. As such, the attribution of powers to or 
operating via naval forces may also ask for change in the national procedural laws if 
such combinations are not possible under domestic law.  
 
Maritime interdiction operations  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, maritime interdiction operations (MIO) are a 
practical tool of how maritime security is implemented at sea. Also the term MIO is as 
said not well defined. The essence of maritime interdiction operations is that MIO are 
naval operations that involve the possibility of boarding a foreign flagged merchant 
vessel by means of the crew of a warship. This obviously leads to jurisdictional 
issues, which goes to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state, which ultimately 
leads to the need to have a legal basis to be able to board a foreign flagged vessel.   
 
As the story goes, the term MIO was coined by the US-Secretary of State during the 
Iraq- Kuwait conflict of 1990. The purpose of this term was to avoid the term 
blockade; which was a word that had too much of a connotation with the term war; a 
word that needed to be avoided in the new world order. After the adoption of UN-
Res. 665 (1990) the term MIO then lived on to become a synonym for naval 
enforcement of economic sanctions imposed by the UNSC. In other words: maritime 
embargo operations. Maritime embargo operations since then became a much used 
tool in peace support operations. Embargo operations were used after Iraq, in the 
former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Sierra Leone. Later the UN established an embargo 
operation off the coast of Lebanon within the UNIFIL operation and most recently in 
2011 with the adoption of SC-Res. 1973 the UN-Security Council authorized an 
embargo off the coast of Libya. 
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The important point from this to note is that during the 1990’s the terms MIO and 
embargo operations were considered to be the same thing. And secondly, form a 
legal perspective MIO was therefore also only connected to one legal basis: namely 
the collective security system of the UN-Charter. Since 9/11 and the developing 
concept of maritime security, also the legal basis upon which a MIO is conducted 
has broadened in scope. Nowadays, there are more legal bases upon which a MIO 
can be considered to be undertaken.  
 
9/11 and beyond 
 
Since 9/11 the term MIO is used also for the MIO that are conducted in the fight 
against Al Qaida and the Taliban. The legal basis for these MIO was considered to 
be self-defence. Next to the fight against Al Qaida and Taliban, in the broader fight 
against terrorism, in particular in connection to WMD, a growing amount of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties were made to find more legal grounds that would allow 
under certain circumstances to board foreign flagged vessels for inspections against 
possible WMD and terrorist threats. Examples that can be mentioned in this context 
are the SUA-Protocol (2005) and the bilateral boarding treaties agreed between the 
US and other States.  
 
Also, the existing possibilities under UNCLOS and more specifically article 110 
UNCLOS, were revisited and explored. Not just the laws of piracy have been taken 
off the shelf and are now used to interdict pirates, but also the concept of stateless 
vessels is used as a legal basis for maritime interdiction operations. We see this 
legal ground for instance used by the French Government in the earlier mentioned 
Medvedyev-case, and also used as a legal basis for stopping the merchant vessel 
So San by the US and Spain in 2002.102 One of the challenges with the legal ground 
of statelessness is that the conditions under which a vessel may be considered 
stateless may not be clear. The Medvedyev case has underlined that it does not 
solely depend on the situation at sea and what the commander can determine with 
his own eyes, but must also be judged by the information that the State has received 
via other channels.  
 
Lastly, and important within the context of enhancing maritime security, is the effort 
to try to seek for more so called maritime awareness at sea. Within this context 
maritime interdiction operations are then used to increase maritime security 
awareness (MSA) in NATO speak, or maritime domain awareness in US-speak- at 
sea. It is obvious that a certain level of awareness of what is happening at sea is 
needed to be able to act against possible threats at sea. One of the legal bases used 
for this is consent, which means basically asking another state to be allowed to come 
on board. One of the issues with consent based boardings however is the question 
of who actually gives the authority to board a vessel. Can the master of the vessel do 
so, or must it be a certain government official of the flag state itself? Different nations 
take different views on this point. Some say that the master is enough to board the 
vessel, whereas others tend to stay with the official authorities of the flag state as the 
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only valid legal authority.103 This issue touches the validity of consent as one of the 
conditions for consent to be a legal ground. A second intertwined issue with consent 
that it has no clear applicable legal regime. With treaty based boardings or boardings 
under the law of naval warfare to certain extent it is clear what can or cannot be 
done, because the legal regime of the treaty or the legal regime of the laws of naval 
warfare provide the conditions. With consent based boarding this is less clear.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Involvement of naval forces to enhance of maritime security has underlined the 
importance of the law enforcement paradigm in the maritime dimension, which 
triggers several legal challenges, most notably the applicability of IHRL and the need 
for an interagency approach.  MIO are a military tool in which maritime security is 
being implemented at sea. Under the growing understanding that naval forces 
should indeed play a role in enhancing maritime security, the scope of what is 
understood by maritime interdiction operations has also broadened. With the 
evolving scope of MIO has also ensured the development of a broadening of the 
legal basis upon which MIO can take place. This variety of legal basis for maritime 
interdiction operations also triggers various legal regimes that become applicable 
during interdiction operations.    
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